Monday, February 05, 2007

Blog 4: Lifeworld: Praxis and Perception

I must admit, I find this book extremely difficult to understand. In this chapter it seems as though Ihde has introduced some of what his ideas are founded from, whether he be against some of these ideals or for some of these ideals. He has looked at three different philosophers, not writing or even thinking about the philosophy of technology, but yet somehow the words and ideas relate to what we have been discussing. These three philosopher's are Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty. He starts with the example of Heidegger's hammer. Within this example, the idea of "in-order-to" is addressed. What in fact is a hammer used for and when used by different people it seems to have a different function. I feel like this idea in someway relates to the idea of a systematic relationship between the human and the hammer. Without the human context, the hammer would not in fact be used, malfunction, or be destroyed. Husserl seems to relate his ideals to Galileo and the idea of geometry. This was the one I found the most confusing in context. He is looking into the lifeworld in a prescientific world and in a scientific world. The context of geometry and shapes from which they come from; the color of these shapes and whether that matters. The idea of shapes within direct means or indirect means. He seems to be showing the bodily connection to science. The fact that science would not be of existence with out that human connection. "Husserl seems to be saying that at base the lifeworld is and must be the sensory lifeworld, based in the relations between actional humans and the concrete, material world of things and beings that are bodily." Husserl is looking into what and how science thinks. Within Merleau-Ponty's passage he uses the example of a woman who can keep enough space from the feather on her hat and other objects that may destroy or alter her feather. She can do this without thinking, without calculated distances and such. Just like when one is driving and knows whether their car can fit in a sport or not. They don't get out to measure both the car and the space, they simply perceive that their car is smaller than that space. I believe that Merleau-Ponty's main point here is perception. And once again human embodiment seems to be evident in this passage. The human mind knows how to work technology and to if you will master it. He in fact mentions the idea of embodied relations and perception by humans. All three of these phenomenology's involved in that of human-technology relations. Are humans in fact a necessary element for technology? I believe that this shows that they are. It was interesting to look into these three philosophers and see the connection that their ideas had to the philosophy of technology.

1 comment:

David Honaker said...

I had to make a comment that just didn't occur to me when I read this chapter. A hammer has no meaning without humans. If a human doesn't pick it up, it is never used, malfunctions, or is destroyed. That statement alone hits me that without us, the hammer is nothing. It is not an object unto itself and it has no meaning beyond what we give it.