Are Wii Becoming Cyborgs? (Blog #4)

In chapter 3, Ihde discusses three types of phenomenological theories concerning the relationship of technology to human beings and the world. The first is Heidegger’s “Hammer”, the second is Husserl’s Galileo and, finally, Merleau-Ponty’s feather. The example that interested me most was Merleau-Ponty’s feather; especially because Dreyfus referred to the philosopher so often.


Ihde notes that in Merleau-Ponty’s theory, “the loved or virtual body as an experienced bodily spatially can be “extendible” through artifacts” (39). The first example is the woman and her feathered hat. Merleau-Ponty observes that the woman wearing the hat may “without ant calculation, keep a safe distance between the feather in her hat and things which might break it off” (39). She actually feels, he says, “where the feather is just as we feel where our hand is” (39). This theory of the connection between objects and people, or, or as Ihde calls it “embodiment relations” (40), is similar to what we discussed in class regarding the “man-gun” scenario. The object, or technology, blends so completely with the person that the two need to be considered as a temporary unity.


Ihde notes that in Merleau-Ponty’s viewpoint, “perceptions may be materially extended through the “body” of an artifact” (40). This is more apparent in Merleau-Ponty’s second example of the blind man and his cane. The French phenomenologist notes that the cane “has ceased to be an object for him and is no longer perceived for itself”, the cane has, in fact, become, “an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch and providing a parallel to sight” (40). This is a very unique and enlightening way to look at human-object interaction. Ihde calls it a “latent phenomenology of instrumentation” (40). I had never truly considered that a hat, a cane, or cars were an extension of my own perception and embodiment--even though I use these items that way. Dreyfus made it clear that Merleau-Ponty saw an intrinsic significance in human embodiment. Indeed, all of his examples display a concrete connection between the object, or technology and the surrounding world. This does not mean, however, that we can’t use Merleau-Ponty’s theory when thinking about “disembodied” technologies like the internet. The internet extends the reach of our consciousness, or imagination not unlike the way the cane extends the blind man’s senses. The same is true of video games; particularly Nintendo’s “Wii” entertainment system. Using the “Wii-mote”, the player can extend their reach into the game. While all games require an embodied component—the player holding the controller at the very least—the Wii takes this to a new level. Take “Wii Tennis” for example. Swinging the Wii-mote in this plane of reality causes the character on the screen to swing a tennis racket. Such developments further complicate the question of embodiment relations and technology. I would be very curious to hear Merleau-Ponty’s opinion on the subject.
If we truly combine, to some extent, with the technology we employ, what does that mean for humans and more abstract and electronic technologies like the internet? Does it mean we temporarily become cyborgs when we use Wii tennis? I doubt it, but Merleau-Ponty’s observations make it a more interesting question to consider.