I'm hopeful this post is not as ridiculous as the title might suggest....
Don Ihde’s “Phenomenology of Technics” (Chapter 5) is an extensive (and quite long) chapter that approaches a wide variety of topics. In the first half of the chapter, Ihde outlines three major ways in which humans relate with technology, or as he calls them, as only Don Ihde can, “focal human-technology relations” (98). They are: embodiment, hermeneutic, and alterity relations. Ihde’s discussion challenges conventional understandings of technology and humanity’s relationship to said technology.
In the opening paragraphs of the alterity section, Ihde criticizes purely objective assessments of technology. He comments that a “naïve objectivist account would likely begin with some attempt to circumscribe or define technologies by object characteristics” (97). He admits that objectivist accounts have something to offer, but ignoring the relativistic properties of tools and technology is myopic. One only needs to watch MacGyver once to realize that technologies can be used for anything—not just what they are, by definition, supposed to do. The show is famous for the ridiculous, but mostly plausible gadgets the hero, MacGyver, creates. In one episode, he created a defibrillator out of candlesticks and electrical cord—you probably would
n’t want to trust your life to that device. For a more approachable example, MacGyver has, in more than one episode, used a gun as a wrench (partially because he is diametrically opposed to the violent use of handguns and partially due to the fact that MacGyver can’t do anything easily). I wonder if Ihde would still characterize this interaction as I-Gun-world (the general intentionality diagram) since Mac uses it as a wrench. This use involves a variety of other factors. Maybe it just requires an entirely new diagram, or it may fall into a different category.
If it is the embodied relationship, where the technology withdraws and becomes symbiotically linked to its user, this diagram would follow:
(MacGyver-gun)-world
This scenario is still lacking. It implies that the gun is applied in the world as a gun. Perhaps another focal relationship is more fitting.
The hermeneutic relationship involves the use of some interpretive schema, such as a map or, another example Ihde uses, a thermometer at a nuclear power plant which in turn refers to the world. Such a relationship is characterized generally:
I-technology-world
This becomes further complicated in a situation where the hermeneutic, let’s say a robot arm (controlled by a panel), is used to move rocks. In this case, the panel controlling the robot “is immediately perceived” (86) not the robot or the world itself. This is diagrammed in a different way:
I-(technology-world)
He quickly adds that this can become “enigmatic” (86). In embodiment relations, such as the use of a gun or a wrench, the fact that the technology and person can become “partially” symbiotic is due to the capacity of the technology to “become perceptually transparent” (86). In the case of any hermeneutic device, however, it is not entirely clear if the panel or the referent, whether it be the world in the case of the thermometer, or the robot arm in my previous example, is the focus of human attention. Ihde lists a few “enigma positions” that result from this confusion. Essentially, it is very difficult to define where the microperceptual withdrawal takes place, but the basic diagram for hermeneutic relationships is:
I-(technology-world)
At first glance, it seems this diagram would not fit the MacGyver-gun scenario, but perhaps it does. For MacGyver to consider using the gun as a wrench, he had to be aware of certain macroperceptual concepts; particularly science. Ihde does not specifically refer to scientific or personal beliefs (such as Mac’s aversion to guns used-as-weapons) as hermeneutic relations, but perhaps they should be. They provide a mediation through which we understand technology and the world, as much as any thermometer or panel might. In addition, MacGyver needs to objectively consider the situation, which in and of itself requires a hermeneutic leap, to decide what sort of object could be used as a wrench. In this case, MacGyver’s understanding of physics, knowing that the gun can be used as a wrench, and his aversion to shooting firearms serve as the hermeneutic through which he employs the referent, the gun, and affects the world:
MacGyver-(gun-world)
This diagram implies that more than the simple use of a firearm is happening. This is a strong way to diagram the gun-wrench problem, but Ihde offers yet another possibility.
The final possible focal relationships are “alterity” relationships. The term alterity, Ihde notes, is derived from Emmanuel Levinas’s Totality and Infinity. In the work, alterity refers to “the radical difference posed to any human by another human, an other (and by the ultimately other, God)” (98). Ihde, however, uses other to refer to technology. This sort of focal relationship has more in common with the “autonomy of technology” viewpoint.
Interestingly, Ihde identifies film as a technology that is in between hermeneutic and alterity relations. He notes that film appears more “life-like” than reading or writing which it “retains the functional features of” (105) so it becomes “quasi-other” at the same time. He quickly adds that its “quasi-alterity” (105) is not apparent in media footage since it serves as a hermeneutic transparency to other realties.
Ihde also indicates the computer as a quasi-other technology, referencing the fact that many users develop anthropomorphic relationships with their word processors. Like many other computer systems, he says, fail to successfully “mimic bodily incarnations” but they nevertheless display “a quasi-otherness within the limits of linguistics and, more particularly, of logical behaviors” (106). Dreyfus spoke at length about this feigned embodiment and the danger that posed to humanity. Ihde, however, classifies works such as 2001: A Space Odyssey as romanticizing “quasi otherness” because they transform technology into complete others which Ihde does not see as possible. He says it retains its “unique role in the human-technology continuum of relations” (106)/.
Ihde diagrams all of this as well:
I---->technology-(-world)
In this relationship, Ihde adds, the world, “may remain context and background, and the technology may emerge as the foreground and focal quasi-other with which I momentarily engage” (107). He further notes that this “disengagement of the technology form its ordinary-use context is also what allows the technology to fall into various disengaged engagements which constitute activities as play, art or sport” (107).
What does this mean for the gun-wrench example? Well, it is not as though the gun becomes a quasi other, or the focus of the activity, the gun is still a tool. However, it briefly does become the focus of activity as MacGyver searches to find something to fill the role of a wrench t. This diagram, therefore, is possible:
MacGyver---->gun-(-world)
This diagram is not entirely applicable, however. It would apply to the series of MacGyver as a whole, though, because it falls into the film category that Ihde believes can be considered an alterity relation; especially since I’ve essentially treated the fictional character as a living entity throughout this post. I will not open that Pandora’s Box at this time, because I’ve already rambled far too long.
I will conclude with an entirely new diagram explaining the gun-wrench paradox. It reverses the alterity relationship. MacGyver is focused on a problem within the world and seeks out a technology to surpass an obstacle on his quest—probably to save a wounded puppy. Here it is:
MacGyver---->world-(-gun)
The gun is in the background, its use isn’t even significant. The personal obstacle within the world faced by our hero is.
In conclusion, I think Ihde’s opening analysis is intriguing and provides a means of considering the complex realities of human-technology relations. Obviously, and Ihde admits to this, the three focal relations he outlines are not the only way of considering human-technology relationships. In a world where it’s possible to create defibrillator out of candlesticks, no one ‘focal relationship” will suffice.
In the opening paragraphs of the alterity section, Ihde criticizes purely objective assessments of technology. He comments that a “naïve objectivist account would likely begin with some attempt to circumscribe or define technologies by object characteristics” (97). He admits that objectivist accounts have something to offer, but ignoring the relativistic properties of tools and technology is myopic. One only needs to watch MacGyver once to realize that technologies can be used for anything—not just what they are, by definition, supposed to do. The show is famous for the ridiculous, but mostly plausible gadgets the hero, MacGyver, creates. In one episode, he created a defibrillator out of candlesticks and electrical cord—you probably would
n’t want to trust your life to that device. For a more approachable example, MacGyver has, in more than one episode, used a gun as a wrench (partially because he is diametrically opposed to the violent use of handguns and partially due to the fact that MacGyver can’t do anything easily). I wonder if Ihde would still characterize this interaction as I-Gun-world (the general intentionality diagram) since Mac uses it as a wrench. This use involves a variety of other factors. Maybe it just requires an entirely new diagram, or it may fall into a different category.If it is the embodied relationship, where the technology withdraws and becomes symbiotically linked to its user, this diagram would follow:
(MacGyver-gun)-world
This scenario is still lacking. It implies that the gun is applied in the world as a gun. Perhaps another focal relationship is more fitting.
The hermeneutic relationship involves the use of some interpretive schema, such as a map or, another example Ihde uses, a thermometer at a nuclear power plant which in turn refers to the world. Such a relationship is characterized generally:
I-technology-world
This becomes further complicated in a situation where the hermeneutic, let’s say a robot arm (controlled by a panel), is used to move rocks. In this case, the panel controlling the robot “is immediately perceived” (86) not the robot or the world itself. This is diagrammed in a different way:
I-(technology-world)
He quickly adds that this can become “enigmatic” (86). In embodiment relations, such as the use of a gun or a wrench, the fact that the technology and person can become “partially” symbiotic is due to the capacity of the technology to “become perceptually transparent” (86). In the case of any hermeneutic device, however, it is not entirely clear if the panel or the referent, whether it be the world in the case of the thermometer, or the robot arm in my previous example, is the focus of human attention. Ihde lists a few “enigma positions” that result from this confusion. Essentially, it is very difficult to define where the microperceptual withdrawal takes place, but the basic diagram for hermeneutic relationships is:
I-(technology-world)
At first glance, it seems this diagram would not fit the MacGyver-gun scenario, but perhaps it does. For MacGyver to consider using the gun as a wrench, he had to be aware of certain macroperceptual concepts; particularly science. Ihde does not specifically refer to scientific or personal beliefs (such as Mac’s aversion to guns used-as-weapons) as hermeneutic relations, but perhaps they should be. They provide a mediation through which we understand technology and the world, as much as any thermometer or panel might. In addition, MacGyver needs to objectively consider the situation, which in and of itself requires a hermeneutic leap, to decide what sort of object could be used as a wrench. In this case, MacGyver’s understanding of physics, knowing that the gun can be used as a wrench, and his aversion to shooting firearms serve as the hermeneutic through which he employs the referent, the gun, and affects the world:
MacGyver-(gun-world)
This diagram implies that more than the simple use of a firearm is happening. This is a strong way to diagram the gun-wrench problem, but Ihde offers yet another possibility.
The final possible focal relationships are “alterity” relationships. The term alterity, Ihde notes, is derived from Emmanuel Levinas’s Totality and Infinity. In the work, alterity refers to “the radical difference posed to any human by another human, an other (and by the ultimately other, God)” (98). Ihde, however, uses other to refer to technology. This sort of focal relationship has more in common with the “autonomy of technology” viewpoint.
Interestingly, Ihde identifies film as a technology that is in between hermeneutic and alterity relations. He notes that film appears more “life-like” than reading or writing which it “retains the functional features of” (105) so it becomes “quasi-other” at the same time. He quickly adds that its “quasi-alterity” (105) is not apparent in media footage since it serves as a hermeneutic transparency to other realties.
Ihde also indicates the computer as a quasi-other technology, referencing the fact that many users develop anthropomorphic relationships with their word processors. Like many other computer systems, he says, fail to successfully “mimic bodily incarnations” but they nevertheless display “a quasi-otherness within the limits of linguistics and, more particularly, of logical behaviors” (106). Dreyfus spoke at length about this feigned embodiment and the danger that posed to humanity. Ihde, however, classifies works such as 2001: A Space Odyssey as romanticizing “quasi otherness” because they transform technology into complete others which Ihde does not see as possible. He says it retains its “unique role in the human-technology continuum of relations” (106)/.
Ihde diagrams all of this as well:
I---->technology-(-world)
In this relationship, Ihde adds, the world, “may remain context and background, and the technology may emerge as the foreground and focal quasi-other with which I momentarily engage” (107). He further notes that this “disengagement of the technology form its ordinary-use context is also what allows the technology to fall into various disengaged engagements which constitute activities as play, art or sport” (107).
What does this mean for the gun-wrench example? Well, it is not as though the gun becomes a quasi other, or the focus of the activity, the gun is still a tool. However, it briefly does become the focus of activity as MacGyver searches to find something to fill the role of a wrench t. This diagram, therefore, is possible:
MacGyver---->gun-(-world)
This diagram is not entirely applicable, however. It would apply to the series of MacGyver as a whole, though, because it falls into the film category that Ihde believes can be considered an alterity relation; especially since I’ve essentially treated the fictional character as a living entity throughout this post. I will not open that Pandora’s Box at this time, because I’ve already rambled far too long.
I will conclude with an entirely new diagram explaining the gun-wrench paradox. It reverses the alterity relationship. MacGyver is focused on a problem within the world and seeks out a technology to surpass an obstacle on his quest—probably to save a wounded puppy. Here it is:
MacGyver---->world-(-gun)
The gun is in the background, its use isn’t even significant. The personal obstacle within the world faced by our hero is.
In conclusion, I think Ihde’s opening analysis is intriguing and provides a means of considering the complex realities of human-technology relations. Obviously, and Ihde admits to this, the three focal relations he outlines are not the only way of considering human-technology relationships. In a world where it’s possible to create defibrillator out of candlesticks, no one ‘focal relationship” will suffice.
No comments:
Post a Comment