Final

1) In my post on March 22 about Harroway and her views on cyborgs, I already showed the different views on her take of cyborgs. On Harroway's thought that everyone is a cyborg, I was at first completely disagreeing. Many people would completely disagree with Harroway. If they thought only literally about the definition (cyborg: part human, part machine), the only true cyborgs would be amputees with fake limbs or people with pace-makers. My first reation was "I am not a cyborg, there are no technological parts to me. I am 100% organic material." And that was that. Then I began to think about it, at first literally, but then metaphorically. I've had knee surgery, and they put some dissolving sutures (I don't know how you spell it) in. I'm sure they've dissolved by now, but does that mean I've still got some synthetic material floating around in me? If not, well, I needed those synthetic sutures to keep the muscles in my knee together at one point in time...so...was I a cyborg then? Does the same saying go for cyborgs as it does for cheaters: "Once a cyborg, always a cyborg?" Am I a cyborg? Then I began to think of all the technological things I have associated with my body. Sometimes I wear contact lenses. Sometimes I wear glasses. Sometimes I wear a watch. Sometimes I wear a knee brace. Sometimes I wear a retainer. I my goodness. I'm a freakin' cyborg. I wear shoes. I use a battery-powered tooth brush. My iPod is pretty much attached to me. I could go on forever. So, from all these things, I think it would be safe to assume that as a person lives, they become increasingly 'cyborg-y,' or, if you prefer, 'cyborg-like.'
That leads to another question. Newborns: completely innocent and naked (pun intended) of any technology--or--fresh-brewed cyborg? Does the fact that there were computer monitors to keep track of the mother's and the newborn's vital signs (among many other technologies involved in delivery) make the newborn a cyborg even before she comes out of the womb? This is definitely arguable.
The only way a person in today's world could not be a cyborg is if they were born on a remote island, with no inhabitants, to a mother who was struck with amnesia without any knowledge of the 'technoligified' (I just made that word up) world. There's your true human.

2) On March 29, I also wrote about the cyborg, this time comparing its cyborg qualities with the qualities of Frankenstein. In March, I tried to find an argument supporting the thought that Frankenstein was a cyborg. When compared to the definition and examples given in the previous answer (#1), Frankenstein would be considered a cyborg because of all of the artificial and technological things that were put into making him. When compared to what Harroway refers to as a cyborg today (everyone), and when discussing his feelings of isolation and lack of a sense of belonging, he is nothing like a cyborg. Since, according to Harroway, everyone is a cyborg, Frankenstein would be compared to everyone. In general, 'everyone' has a sense of belonging. There are a few individuals who have lost that sense because of moving to a new place, maybe just finding out that they are adopted, or just not fitting in with their peers. None of these reasons are because they have cyborg-like qualities, though. 'Everyone' doesn't feel like they don't fit in because they are cyborgs. Like I mentioned in March, a grandmother probably doesn't feel like she fits in any more or less because of her new pace-maker. If anything, I would think that new cyborg-like qualities would make a person feel like they fit in more. For example: A young boy may have his leg amputated because of an accident. He would have to spend the rest of his life in a wheel chair if it wasn't for his prosthetic (once again, not sure about spelling) leg. He may feel a little out of place because he doesn't have a leg, but he would feel more out of place if he wasn't ever able to walk again and have to be stuck in a wheel chair forever. So, in this case, the presence of 'cyborg-ness' actually causes more of a sense of belonging than its absence.